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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that on many important public policy questions, people may 
be unsure of their preferences because their underlying principles or values are in conflict. 
We build a simple model of conflicting core beliefs, building on the work of Heider 
( 1958). Using abortion policies as our test case, we develop a test for our theory using 
heteroskedastic probit, using data taken from the 1988 General Social Survey. The 
heteroskedastic probit results confirm our model, and in the last section of the pa.per, 
we trace the implications of this model for some of the larger questions in public opinion 
research. 
WHEN CORE BELIEFS COLLIDE: CONFLICT, 
COMPLEXITY, OR JUST PLAIN CONFUSION? * 
R. Michael Alvarez John Brehm 
1 Introduction 
The premise of our paper is that important political debates involve fundamentally tough 
questions, where deeply held and widely shared core beliefs, principles, or values, are in 
conflict. Occasionally, we arrive at consensus about how to settle difficult questions 
- when to go to war in the Persian Gulf, or when to withdraw from Viet Nam, for 
instance. And often we 'debate' what are surely valence questions - like respect for 
the flag, which was a prominent example in a recent Presidential election. But the most 
challenging questions for political elites and mass publics alike are conflictual, like the 
rights of choice vs. respect for life in the debate over abortion policy, the protection 
of timber jobs or protection of endangered species, or the toleration of racist speech 
vs. redressing concerns of minorities. No doubt, there are some people who have little 
difficulty resolving these debates, but for the bulk of us these are hard choices. And if 
they are hard choices for elites, they will be hard choices for many in the public when 
interviewed for mass surveys. 
This problem of ambivalent responses to difficult questions grows out of the expanding 
research on 'core beliefs' (e.g. , Feldman, 1988). This literature shows great promise 
towards identifying something like a system of mass beliefs. Converse [ 1964] documented 
the difficulties in finding anything like an overarching ideology in all but a scant fraction 
of the mass public. Of course, the past three decades has seen considerable research 
to challenge Converse's original findings. Verba and Nie [ 1972] questioned whether a 
more politically active time might reveal greater structur� to mass beliefs. Lane [ 1962] 
suggested that the survey technique itself could not reveal nuances in beliefs. Achen 
[ 1975] pointed to measurement error, arguing that it's not fuzzy respondents, but fuzzy 
questions that account for the instability of preferences. Yet after all that research, we 
are left with Kinder's [ 1983] review article observing that there are many bases to mass 
beliefs. 
*Paper prepared for presentation at the 1993 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, D.C. 
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Instead of a single over-arching ideology, recent research identifies nuggets of core be­
liefs around which a surprisingly rich collection of preferences appear to be structured. 
Feldman [1988] showed that values of equality of opportunity, economic individualism, 
and free enterprise went a long way toward explaining survey responses on welfare, gov­
ernment spending, federal activism, and support for minorities. Kinder and Sanders 
[1990] used split sample techniques to show how framing questions of affirmative action 
in terms of reverse discrimination (as opposed to undeserved advantages) were strongly 
related not just to questions of racial policy, but also to preferences for political candi­
dates. 
The presence of core beliefs in opposition to one another presents a prob1em for survey 
response. Feldman and Zaller [1992] put this problem as the 'ambivalence axiom': "Most 
people possess opposing considerations on most issues, that is, considerations that might 
lead them to decide the issue either way." In combination with two further axioms (the 
"response axiom" and the "accessibility axiom"), Feldman and Zaller are able to develop a 
model explaining response stability, ideological consistency, and general response effects. 
(Table 9, page 608, of their article lists seventeen different empirical phenomena their 
model purports to explain). They identify three related ways for checking ambivalence: 
counts of opposing remarks, spontaneous expressions of ambivalence or difficulty making 
up their minds, and counts of "two-sided" comments. 
While these methods do demonstrate the presence of opposing considerations (Feld­
man and Zaller's definition of ambivalence), they are not necessarily indicative of un­
derlying conflict. At one extreme, it is possible to be categorized as ambivalent under 
Feldman and Zaller's method, while not really 'considering' both sides of a question: Re­
spondents who are well-educated and well-informed about policy questions may be able 
to provide the arguments of both sides of a debate, while adhering more strongly to one, 
or to neither. At another extreme, the presence of opposing considerations potentially 
increases support for one position. The so-called 'inoculation effect' arises when sub­
jects exposed to two-sided messages are better able to resist later counter-messages than 
those subjects exposed to one-sided messages (e.g. , Lumsdaine and Janis 19.53; Hovland, 
Lumsdaine, and Sheffield 1949; McGuire 1964 ). 
We argue in this paper that in many cases individual core beliefs will be in conflict, not 
merely the considerations they draw upon when formulating their survey response. When 
core beliefs conflict, it becomes difficult for an individual to determine their position on 
related policy choices. We believe this conflict on some important core beliefs may 
account for the uncertainty respondents have on many dimensions of public policy (e.g. 
Alvarez and Franklin 1993) as well as the perplexing problem.of.r.esponseinsta.bility (e.g. 
Feldman and Zaller 1992). 
What do we mean, though, when we say that core beliefs are conflictual? Take 
abortion as the policy of interest. It is very likely that some individuals might feel 
that women should have the right to control their bodies, while also believing that all 
human life is important. These individuals, we argue, have conflicting core beliefs. And 
since their beliefs conflict, these individuals will have more difficulty with policy choices 
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concerning abortion. For example, when asked if a woman should be allowed to terminate 
a pregnancy for any reason whatsoever, individuals with conflicting core beliefs will have 
more difficulty determining their position, and their answer to the survey question. 
So, if our suspicions are correct - that conflict between core beliefs makes for difficult 
choices and uncertain or unstable responses - then we require different methods to 
identify such conflict. Further, if it is conflict that matters, then response effects take on 
a deeper significance in questions of the responsiveness of elites to mass opinion. 
Our paper develops a model of opinion on conflicting questions. In the next section 
of the paper we lay out a simple model which draws upon balance theory (Heider 1958) 
to depict the conflict between core beliefs. This model implies, for policy questions 
which have uncertain relationships to the underlying core beliefs, that individuals with 
conflicting beliefs will have more difficulty with these policy questions. In the second 
section of this paper we outline a test of this implication, involving heteroskedastic probit 
models. There, we focus exclusively on abortion as our test case. In the last section we 
close with a brief discussion of the implications of our work. 
2 A Model of Conflicting Core Beliefs and Ambiva­
lent Responses 
Our model takes as its beginning the ideas in "balance theory" developed by Heider in 
the 1940s and 1950s. Heider [1958] explored the problems of balance in triads involving a 
person (P), an other person (0), and an outside object (C). Each of the three relationships 
(P-0, P-C, 0-C) may be positively or negatively signed. A triad is balanced when the 
product of the signs of the three relationship is positive, and in imbalance when the 
product is negative. Figure 1 displays the four balanced and four imbalanced triads. For 
example, suppose that person P likes Bill Clinton (C), person 0 likes Clinton, and P likes 
0. This triad is balanced. Likewise, if P likes Clinton, 0 hates Clinton, but P dislikes 0,
the triad is also balanced. If P likes Clinton, 0 hates Clinton, but P likes 0, then the 
relationship is imbalanced. 
Imbalanced relationships encourage P and 0 to resolve the problem. There are three 
ways in which an imbalanced triad can be balanced: the sign of one of the relationships 
could change (P could learn to dislike 0 or to dislike Clinton); one of the relationships 
could become a null relationship (P severs connections to O); or the relationship to C 
or 0 could ch<:mge (O·-hates Glittton,·but likes·t·he·deficit.Te<luction package) (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1981, pp. 128-129). 
As difficult as these triads may be, the problem becomes much more complex when 
another person is added to the relationships. Figure 2 displays a nested triad involving 
two others and a single object. Suppose that P maintains a positive relationship with 
both 01 and 02 (e.g. , if both are P's parents). 01 likes object X, while 02 dislikes 
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object C. P is in a bind: there is no sign on his relationship to C that restores balance 
to the entire system. 
This problem is very close to the model of ambivalent response due to conflicting 
principles. (See Figure 3). Suppose that a respondent, R, is questioned about a policy 
that pertains to two distinct principles. R holds an attachment to each principle, Pt and 
p2 for principles 1 and 2 respectively. R further perceives that the policy under question 
accomplishes principle 1 with efficiency ei, and principle 2 with efficiency e2. 
R's expected position on the policy (µ) is the following simple equation:
(1) 
R is perfectly ambivalent when 
(2) 
That is, R holds an opinion about both principles, but the combination of the policy and 
R's attachments to the policy are equal in magnitude. 
A more likely scenario arises when R is uncertain about the efficiency of the policy, 
but not the principles involved. (That is, both p1 and p2 are constants). R is in a state 
of imperfect ambivalence when the variance of e1p1 overlaps the variance of e2p2 by some 
degree of uncertainty ( t): 
(3) 
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances when R holds positive attachments to 
two principles, but where the policy is adverse to one principle and strongly positive to 
another. Again, consider abortion policy: for many respondents, abortion represents a 
conflict between the woman's right to choose, and a respect for human life beginning 
sometime before birth. It is no accident that the activists on both sides chose positive 
labels ("pro-choice" and "pro-life"), and do not see themselves in the negative (as "anti­
choice" or "anti-fetus"). If the policy in question is sufficiently uncertain as to how it 
respects both those principles, we should not be surprised to find that many respondents 
have difficulty answering questions about abortion, and that the responses appear to be 
excruciatingly sensitive to question wording. 
It is also possible to imagine policies where there is some asymmetry in how efficiently 
the policy accomplishes each principle. For example, the earliest exception permitting 
abortion was to protect the life of the mother {see Ginsburg, 1989). This policy ac­
complishes the principle of respecting the woman's rights reasonably efficiently, but the 
conflict between the lives of mother and fetus lends ambiguity to the principle of re­
specting life. Some respondents may have little difficulty answering these questions, even 
though the principles may be in conflict. 
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The most direct way to test this model would be to question for attachments to well­
defined and widely shared core beliefs, and to assess how the respondent perceives the 
efficiency with which specific policies accomplish the core beliefs. We know of no such 
data set that would permit such a direct test. But the foregoing algebra leads to an 
indirect test for conflict of principles. 
Suppose that the question about policy is a binary choice: should we pass the law 
or not? We would conventionally approach this problem with a logit or probit model. 
However, both the logit and probit approaches assume constant error variance, and we 
have strong grounds under which to suspect that error variance is systematic with respect 
to the extent to which the respondent feels a conflict between the principles (Equation 
3). Ignoring the heteroskedasticity of the probit or logit model will lead to erroneous 
estimates. More to the point, modelling the heteroskedasticity directly allows us to 
explore the nature of conflict in the respondent's attitudes. 
We model this heteroskedasticity in a probit model of policy choice by by the following 
two equations (Greene 1993): 
Yi= Xi/3 + ci 
V AR[ci] = [expZn]2
(4) 
(5) 
where y"[ is a binary response to a policy question, Xi and Zi are matrices of independent
variables, ci is an error term, and /3 and I are coefficient vectors to estimate. 
This produces a log-likelihood function very similar to the usual probit log-likelihood: 
logL = L Yilog<P ( xi� )-(1-yi) log [1-<P ( xi� )] 
i exp •" exp •" 
(6) 
There are also a set of quite simple tests for heteroskedasticity in probit models (Davidson 
and MacKinnon 1984) which we will employ. Unless we can reject the null hypothesis 
that the error variances are homoskedastic (i.e. , that I = 0), then there is no point 
proceeding with our analysis. We utilize only the most intuitive test, a likelihood ratio 
test for heteroskedasticity. The likelihood ratio test involves a comparison of an unre­
stricted model (one with a fully-specified variance model) to a restricted model (in which 
homoskedasticity is assumed) .1
3 Attitudes Toward Abortion 
Abortion remains one of the most conflictual issues in American politics, figuring promi­
nently in state and national elections for a wide range of political offices. It also remains 
one of the most sensitive subjects with respect to question wording. 
1 As Davidson and MacKinnon (1984) discuss, there are three heteroskedasticity tests possible: the 
likelihood ratio test, the Lagrange multiplier test, and the Wald test. We employ the former test since 
in our application it was not difficult to compute. One problem with these tests for heteroskedasticity, 
however, is that they can also pick up model misspecification. 
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One simple illustration took place in the 1980 American National Election Studies Pre­
and Post-Election surveys. There were two wordings of the question in 1980, changing 
the categories for response. (Both versions of the questions were taken from the American 
National Election Studies Sourcebook (Miller and Traugott 1987, p. 166). One version 
of the question read: 
Still on the subject of women's rights, there has been some discussion about 
abortion durinJl: recent years. Which one of the opinions on this card best agrees 
with your view'"'? You can just tell me then number of the opinion you choose. 
(1) Abortion should never be permitted, (2) Abortion should be permitted 
only if the life and health of the woman is in danger, (3) Abortion should 
be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty in 
caring for the child, ( 4) Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should 
not require a woman to have a child she doesn't want. 
The alternate version read: 
There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which 
one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell 
me the number of the opinion you choose. (1) By law, abortion should never 
be permitted, (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, 
or when the woman's life is in danger, (3) The law should permit abortion for 
reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after 
the need for the abortion has been clearly established, ( 4) By law, a woman 
should be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. 
The alternate categories elicited very different responses. Table 1 displays the different 
marginals for the two versions. The percentage of respondents who selected the most 
extreme pro-life position ("Never" ) was the same for both wordings (11 % ). The fraction 
selecting the most extreme pro-choice position ("Anytime" or "As a Matter of Personal 
Choice" ) increases by 11 percentage points, or a relative increase in that category of 
nearly 50%. It should be apparent why the latter wording drew greater response: framing 
the question as a question of personal choice taps into the deep psychological effect of 
reactance. 2 
This example serves our purpose in two ways. First, it shows that the individual choice 
is one important core value that trips on the question of abortion. Second, it shows the 
effects of eliciting different core beliefs in a survey question can be quite profound - if 
those core beliefs conflict and lead individuals to ,provide different policy positions for 
themselves. 
But an equally important value, for many respondents, is the question of respect for 
life beginning sometime before birth. In the NES question, although one could cast the 
2Reactance is aroused when a subject believes that a freedom has been removed, and can be triggered 
even if the subject has no desire to exercise that freedom. See Brehm (1966) for more on the theory of 
reactance. 
6 
vast majority of respondents under either question wording as supporting abortion rights 
under some contexts (the last three categories), one could also interpret the marginals 
as supporting some restrictions on abortion. 
The NES question on abortion is, however, a relatively weak one. The General Social 
Survey, for years, has included a more complex battery of questions on abortion. Instead 
of asking respondents to choose among a limited set of options, the GSS battery asks 
respondents whether they believe abortion should be allowed under any of seven circum­
stances, for each scenario separately. The question reads, "Please tell me whether or not 
you think it should be possible for a pregnamt woman to obtain a legal abortion if. . ." 
• If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?
• If she is married and does not want any more children?
• If the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy?
• If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?
• If she became pregnant as a result of rape?
• If she is not married and does not want to marry the man?
• The woman wants if for any reason?
In terms of the difficult policy choices facing elected officials, the GSS battery comes 
much closer than the NES to the actual decisions they would have to face. The GSS 
battery thus makes for an excellent opportunity to test our arguments about the role of 
conflicting core beliefs and values in producing ambivalent response. 
The first part of our model is to predict levels of support for abortion rights under each 
of the seven scenarios. For the development of this model, we reach into the burgeoning 
literature on abortion attitudes. In order to accumulate sufficient variables to test this 
model, we use the 1982 GSS.3 
Luker (1984) describes the conflict in attitudes towards abortion as stemming from 
fundamental conceptions of the role of women. While direct questions about women's 
roles would be especially useful, we lack such direct measures for the particular years of 
the GSS question. We do, however, have a measure of support for the ERA. By the later 
years of the campaign by pro-ERA activists, many of these activists explicitly linked 
support for the ERA with abortion rights (see Mansbridge 1986, pp. 122-128). We 
include ERA Support, the response to the question "Do you strongly favor, somewhat 
favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this amendment?" ERA Support is scaled 
from 0 (strongly oppose) to 1 (strongly support). 
Additionally, Luker (1984) also found that religion remained a significant contributor 
to pro-life activism. We include several measures: Catholic is a dummy variable denoting 
3More detailed discussion of the variables used in our analysis is in the Appendix. 
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whether the respondent is a catholic; Attend Church records the frequency with which the 
respondent attends church, scaled from 0 (never) to 8 (several times a week); Religious 
Intensity records whether the respondent expressed a strong religous intensity, scaled 
from 0 (not religious) to 1 (very strong religious preference). 
We include two dummy variables for race and gender: Black denotes whether the 
respondent is black, and Male denotes the respondent's sex. Black Americans have 
had persistently stronger opposition to abortion than whites, even after controlling for 
religion, education, social status, and region (Combs and Welch 1982; Hall and Ferree 
1986; Brehm 1993). Gender has not had a convincingly consistent relationship with 
abortion attitudes, even if the problem is seen by some activists as a question of women's 
rights. 
The second half of our model requires development of predictions for the error variance 
in the binary choice part of the model. Our basic argument is that individuals who 
possess strong attachments to both of the underlying core principles should have a harder 
time making a decision about abortion; hence they should have a greater error variance. 
One way of noting whether the respondent has actually thought about both of the core 
principles is to ask the respondent to elaborate on the reasons for and against abortion. 
The 1982 GSS asked, in an open-ended code, for the respondents to state reasons both 
for and against abortion. We include both Pro Count and Con Count, which are simply 
counts of the number of reasons for and against. Since we are arguing that it is the 
simultaneous presence of both attitudes that should increase error variance, we look 
toward the product of the two. 
The GSS also asked respondents how much information they had on the abortion 
debate, how firm their opinions were about abortion, and how important the problem of 
abortion is to them. We include measures for all three of these in the error variance part 
of the model. Note that one would probably not expect strength of opinions on abortion 
to affect the direction of support, but instead to affect the difficulty respondents have in 
stating their position. 
We estimate the heteroskedastic probit model for each of the seven indicators of at­
titudes toward abortion, and report the results of these estimates in Table 2. At the 
bottom of this table, we report the likelihood ratio tests for heteroskedasticity in each of 
these models. 
Our discussion of the results of the heteroskedastic probit model begins with the choice 
models. Note that the findings of the general literature on attitudes toward abortion 
policy remain entirely intact. Black respondents were more likely to disfavor abortion 
under all seven of the scenarios: the coefficient on Black is always negative, and in all 
but in case ("too poor"), the coefficient is statistically significant. The puzzle of strong 
black opposition to abortion remains confirmed in our estimates here. 
Men are always more inclined to oppose abortion under all seven alternatives, but the 
estimates are not statistically significant in four of the seven cases ("mothers' health," 
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"too poor," "no more children," and "single"). While there might be some interest in 
the relationship of gender to attitudes about abortion, the evidence here is that gender 
is not an overwhelming or consistent predictor of such attitudes. 
Religiousity clearly affects attitudes toward abortion, and in significant ways. Being 
Catholic is not the best reflection of religiousity as it pertains to abortion, however. The 
coefficient on Catholic is of inconsistent sign across the seven models, and statistically dis­
tinguishable from zero in only two of those cases ("mothers' health" and "birth defect"). 
Religious Intensity is consistently negative: those who have strong religous preferences 
are more likely to reject abortion under all seven scenarios, and to a statistically signfi­
cant degree in all but two of those cases ("rape" and "no more children"). Frequency of 
attending church turns out to be the strongest measure in the model. The coefficient is 
always negative, always statistically significant. Note also that this is the only variable 
whose scale runs from 0 to 8 (instead of 0 to 1 ), so that at its maximum range, it has a 
powerful effect undermining support for abortion. 
Mere knowledge of the ERA has no influence on support for abortion - in no case 
were the coefficients on knowledge of the ERA significant, and the variable does change 
sign. Support for the ERA, however, is a powerful predictor of support for abortion 
rights in all but one of the scenarios ("rape"). 
We think the forgoing findings are useful in and of themselves, since they demonstrate 
the many bases of attitudes towards abortion and point to possible sources of conflict. 
But the most intriguing aspect of the problem arises in the variance model. First, notice 
that of the seven probit models we estimated, only one of the likelihood ratio tests 
for heteroskedasticity does not exceed the critical x2 value of 12.9 (the model "no more
children"). The remaining six models, though, show strong evidence of heteroskedasticity. 
Next, we want to draw particular attention to the coefficient on the interaction term 
between the number of reasons offered for and against abortion. Respondents who are ex­
periencing ambivalence and can give both positive and negative mentions about abortion 
should be more difficult for the standard probit approach to model, under some circum­
stances. In the case of support for abortion when the mother's health is in danger, being 
able to give both positive and negative reasons decreased the error variance, and to a 
statistically signifiant degree. We argued above that the health of the mother is the "eas­
iest" waiver for respondents to grant for abortion rights. In the terms of our story about 
ambivalence, the ambiguity about the problem of respecting human life might make this 
a relatively straightforward - if wrenching - decision for respondents to make. 
Likewise, support for abortion rights in the case of rape and birth defect follow con­
sistently with the history of restrictions under abortion. Ginsburg (1989) describes the 
emergence of abortion under circumstances other than for the health of the mother with 
the terrible Rubella epidemics of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the horrific birth 
defects from thalidomide poisoning. These disasters led to more relaxed laws permitting 
so-called 'therapeutic' abortions. In the present model, the interaction terms are nega­
tive, but not statistically significant at conventional levels. The implication is that being 
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able to rehearse both positive and negative mentions decreased the error variance, but 
only slightly so. 
In each of the remaining four models, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, 
and statistically significant (although only at p < .10 for "too poor"). That is, the error 
variances for respondents who could express both reasons for and against abortion were 
consistently greater. We take this result to be indirect, but strong, evidence of the effect 
of conflicting beliefs on ambivalent attitudes toward abortion policy. 
Other coefficients in the error variance model are worthy of comment. First, an 
identical story can be told for the effect of firmness of opinion on ambivalent response. 
Respondents with firm opinions about abortion appeared less ambivalent under the first 
three scenarios, but more ambivalent under the more problematic reasons to grant excep­
tions for abortion. Also, the effect of being able to rehearse a reason favoring abortion 
in every case decreased the error variance. In other words, those respondents who could 
express positive reasons were less likely to be ambivalent, all other things held equal. Be­
ing able to recite reasons against abortion increased ambivalence under the three "easy" 
abortion waivers, but decreased ambivalence under the harder waivers. This is further 
indication of how conflicting values presents a significant problem, in this case, for pro-life 
respondents under conditions of threats to the mother's health, rape, or birth defects. 
Note that the importance of the question of abortion rights to the respondent was 
statistically distinguishable from zero in one scenario only ("mother's health"), and that 
it tended to increase ambivalence, rather than to decrease it. Furthermore, respondents 
who felt well informed about abortion were more ambivalent under the two extreme 
positions ("mother's health" and "any reason"). One feature of ambivalence in contrast 
to uncertainty is that additional information should reduce uncertainty but that it need 
not reduce ambivalence; this finding is consistent with that expression. 
The findings from these heteroskedastic probit models are entirely consistent with our 
arguments about ambivalence arising from conflicting core values. When core values are 
of equal weight, and a policy equally implicates both, then the respondents are more 
ambivalent in their responses and harder for our standard models to predict. It is only 
when there is some asymmetry in the implications of the policy for the principles when 
respondents appear to be less ambivalent. 
4 Discussion 
We have presented a simple model demonstrating how core beliefs can conflict - and 
how that conflict influences the policy preferences of individuals. Also, we provided a 
set of simple tests of the model, focusing on heteroskedastic probit models of abortion 
policy preferences. In these models, we found strong evidence to support our model of 
conflicting core beliefs and ambilivant survey responses. 
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Of course, an explicit focus on only one issue, abortion, is inadequate. We need 
to extend the model to other issues in order to show that the model has implications 
beyond this single, divisive issue. We plan to turn to racial issues in the near term, since 
we have strong expectations that the core principles underlying racial policy preferences 
may conflict for many individuals. Unfortunately, we have not yet identified data as rich 
as the GSS abortion data we employed in this analysis, which we can use to extend the 
model to racial issues. 
Our model also has broad ramifications for many problems in public opinion research. 
The implication we tested here, that individuals with conflicting abortion principles have 
greater error variances in their responses to many abortion policy questions, has direct 
linkages to the growing literature on imperfect information in political behavior (Alvarez, 
1992; Alvarez and Franklin, 1993; Bartels, 1986; Franklin, 1991; Page, 1978). For our 
model implies that individuals with conflicting core beliefs may have more "uncertain" 
opinions about their policy positions. 
Additionally, our model has immediate implications for the literature on the survey 
response (Achen, 1975; Feldman and Zaller, 1992b). Individuals with conflicting core 
beliefs may respond to survey questions differently than those with consistent core be­
liefs. Indeed, in Table 1, where we presented the responses to alternative wordings of 
abortion exceptions in the 1980 ANES, we argued that the differences in responses may 
be attributed to the effects of conflicting core principles on abortion. 
Relatedly, this means that we may shed some new light on the perplexing question of 
response temporal instability. Given that those with conflicting core principles might be 
quite sensitive to changes in question wording, it is also possible that their responses to 
the same questions may be volatile in panel formats. If their core beliefs collide, making 
their policy preferences relatively uncertain, respondents may exhibit a greater tendency 
to give different answers to the same question across repeated interviews. 
And last our model has implications for the larger realm of politics, where elites and 
public opinion interact, and where the level of analysis is on aggregate changes of public 
preferences. As a recent example of these analyses, Page and Shapiro (1992, p. 20) 
argued: 
For our purposes, however, the most important implication is that the logic 
of averaging out random fluctuations in order to find a stable central tendency 
applies even better to collective than to individual opinion . . .  So long as the 
measurement errors in different individuals' opinion.s are n�t systen:atically related to each other, such a survey can product a highly reliable estimate of 
collective preferences, as of the moment of interviewing. 
Our model and our empirical results strongly suggest that this assertion underlying Page 
and Shapiro's work, and most aggregate analysis of public opinion, are incorrect if they 
rely on such assumptions. When policy preferences are based on core principles, we have 
shown that the measurement errors can correlated across individuals. This means that 
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simple aggregation of individual policy preference data can be quite misleading, since 
the aggregates will not correctly approximate the underlying public beliefs about the 
particular policy issue. 
This opens the door to an interesting approach to the interaction between elite and 
mass opinion. For, what if elites sense the underlying conflict between core principles? 
This may mean that to influence mass opinion on a certain policy choice, elites will either 
try to intensify the conflict between the principles, or that they may try to eliminate the 
conflict for many individuals. An example of such a process may be the issue of racial 
desegregation during the 1960's (e.g. , Carmines and Stimson, 1989) . An another way to
look at the dramatic changes in elite behavior and public opinion about this issue during 
this period is that for an important segment of the public, their core beliefs about civil 
rights and equality may have been influenced by the changing positions of key elites and 
the political parties on the issue of desegregation. Certainly other examples of similar 
elite behavior exist. 
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Appendix 
The heteroskedastic probit model for attitudes toward abortion policy relied upon 
the 1982 General Social Survey, extracted from the cumulative GSS file for 1972-1991. 
The data were collected for the National Data Program for the Social Sciences, National 
Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. The data were distributed by the Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. 
• Abortion Policy - The question text read "Please tell me whether or not you think
it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if..." (READ
EACH STATEMENT, AND CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH. "(A) If there is a
strong chance of serious defect in the baby? (B) If she is married and does not want
any more children? (C) If the woman's own health is seriously endangered by the
pregnancy? (D) If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more
children? (E) If she became pregant as a result of rape? (F) If she is not married
and does not want to marry the man? (G) The woman wants it for any reason?"
We coded the responses into seven dummy variables, with answers of 'yes' coded 1,
'no' coded 0, all other values set to missing data.
• Black - This dummy variable was coded 1 if the respondent was black, 0 otherwise. 
• Male - This dummy variable was coded 1 if the respondent was male, 0 otherwise. 
• Catholic - This dummy variable was coded 1 if the respondent was a Catholic, 0 
otherwise. Religious preference was determined by the following question, "What is 
your religous preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, someother religion, or 
no religion?" 
• Religious Intensity - This variable was coded from the followup question to religious
preference, "Would you call yourself a strong (PREFERENCE NAMED) or a not
very strong (PREFERENCE NAMED)?" This variable was set to 1 for strong pref­
erence, .67 for not very strong preference, .33 for somewhat strong preference, and
0 for no religious preference.
• Attend Church - This variable was coded from the question "How often do you
attend religious services?" with codes 0 (never), 1 (less than once a year), 2 (about
once or twice a year), 3 (several times a year), 4 (about once a month), 5 (2 - 3
times a month), 6 (nearly every week), 7 (every week), and 8 (several times a week).
• ERA Means - This varia:ble·wft:S· coded from·+he·qnestion "Do you understand what
the Equal Rights Amendment means?" with yes coded as 1, no coded as 0, all others
as missing data.
• ERA Support - This variable was coded from the question "Do you strongly favor,
somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose this amendment?" with
the codes 1 (strongly favor), .67 (somewhat favor), .33 (somewhat oppose), and 0
(strongly oppose). All other responses were missing data.
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• Pro Count - This variable was coded from the question "As far as you've heard what
are the main arguments in favor of abortions?" with the value being the number of
reasons offered by the respondent.
• Con Count - This variable was coded from "And, as far as you've heard, what are
the main arguments against abortion?" with the value being the number of reasons
offered by the respondent.
• Abortion Importance - This variable was coded from "How important is the abortion
issue to you - would you say it is one of the most important, important, not
very important, or not important at all?" Codes were 1 (most important), .67
(important), .33 (not very important), and 0 (not important at all).
• Abortion Info - This variable was coded from the question "How much information do
you have about the abortion issue? Do you have all the information you need, most
of the information, some information, or very little information?" with the codes 1
(all the information), .67 (most of the information), .33 (some of the information),
0 (very little information).
• Abortion Firm - This variable was coded from "How firm are you about your opinion
on abortion - would you say you are very likely to change your opinion, somewhat
likely to change, somewhat unlikely to change, or very unlikely to change?" with
the codes 0 (very likely to change), .33 (somewhat likely), .67 (somewhat unlikely),
and 1 (very unlikely).
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Table 1: Responses to alternate wordings of abortion exceptions 
Category Pct Category Pct 
Never 11 Abortion Never Permitted 11 
If health is in danger 44 Only in Case of Rape, Incest or Danger 32 
If personal difficulty 17 Only When Need Clearly Established 18 
Anytime 27 As a Matter of Personal Choice 36 
Don't Know 4 Don't Know 4 
Source: 1980 American National Election Studies. 
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Table 2: Heteroskedastic Probit Estimates of Attitudes Toward Abortion Policy, 1982 
General Social Survey 
Variable Mothers' Rape Birth Too No More Single Any 
Health Defect Poor Children Reason 
Choice Model 
Constant 2.55 1.92 2.02 .02 . 03 .11 -.07 
(.46) ( .40) ( .40) (.01) (.08) (.09) (. 13) 
Black -.51 -.47 -.54 -.09 -.11 -.23 -.15 
(.14) ( .13) ( .15) (.06) (.06) (.10) (.09) 
Male -.08 -.20 -.21 -.04 -.02 -.06 -.13 
( .11) ( . 09) ( .11) (.04) (.03) ( .05) (.07) 
Catholic -.52 -.15 -. 33 .01 .02 -.03 .05 
( . 13) (.10) ( .12) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.07) 
Religious Intensity -.39 -.17 -.51 -.17 -.13 -.18 -.22 
( .20) ( .14) ( .19) (.10) ( .69) (.09) (.12) 
Attend Church -1.04 -.99 -.91 -.35 -.43 -.47 -.79 
(.25) ( .23) ( .24) ( . 17) ( .17) ( .20) (.26) 
Know What 
ERA Means -.18 -.14 . 01 .10 . 09 .09 . 12 
( .17) ( . 15) ( .16) (.08) (.07) (.08) (.10) 
Support ERA .33 .12 .40 .22 .31 .31 .51 
( .17) ( .14) ( .18) (.12) (.13) ( .13) ( .17) 
Variance Model 
Pro Count -.14 -.19 -.06 -.25 -.26 -.34 -.22 
( .07) (.09) (.08) ( .22) ( .18) ( . 17) (. 15) 
Con Cont .17 .20 . 37 -.50 -.58 -.41 -.48 
(.09) (.12) ( .12) ( . 19) ( .17) ( .16) ( . 14) 
Pro Count 
x Con Count -.44 -.03 -.09 .19 .25 .21 . 22 
(.04) (.05) (.05) ( .11) (.09) (.08) ( .08) 
Importance .51 .17 -.14 -.16 -.18 -.24 -.30 
( .15) (.15) ( .16) ( .31) ( .26) ( .25) (.25) 
Information .37 -.13 . 05 -.32 -.28 -.28 .68 
( .13) ( .14) ( .14) (.29) ( .25) (.24) .23) 
Firmness of Opinion -.37 -.58 -.61 . 60 .47 1.81 .63 
( . 16) ( .17) ( .16) (.58) ( .43) (.67) ( .38) 
Heteroskedasticity Test
Likelihood Ratio Test (x2) 47.4t 46.7t 41.2t 12.5 19.9t 27.2t 25.9t 
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Figure 2: A difficult nested balance problem 
Principle 1 Principle 2 
Policy 
F igure 3: Ambivalent response under conflicting principles 
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